CASE DIGEST – ARTICLE 48, FAMILY CODE – Emilio Tuason v. CA and Maria Victoria Tuason

Role of Fiscal and Solicitor General:

CASE DIGEST – Article 48

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EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.

G.R. No. 116607             April 10, 1996

PUNO, J.:

 

Facts:

Private respondent Maria Victoria Tuason was married to petitioner Emilio Tuason on June 3, 1972 and had two children. However, at the time of the marriage, Emilio manifested psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations and resulted to violent fights between husband and wife. Due to the series of physical abuse against the respondent, the petitioner’s use of prohibited drugs, cohabiting with three women, leaving the conjugal home and giving minimal child support, abuse of conjugal property use and incurring of bank debts without the respondent’s consent, she filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of their marriage in 1989 before the RTC Makati on the ground of psychological incapacity and prayed for powers of administration to save conjugal properties from further dissipation.

Emilio filed his Opposition to private respondent’s petition for appointment as administratix of the conjugal properties of gains on April 18, 1990. The trial court scheduled the reception of petitioner’s evidence on May 11, 1990. A counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June, thus granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.

However, on June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent’s marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent.

Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the decision.

On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a “Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties” and was opposed by the petitioner on October 17, 1990.

Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision. The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991 which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on July 1994. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not that in the absence of the petitioner in the hearing, the court should have ordered a prosecuting officer to intervene under Article 48 of the Family Code.

Held:

In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had already become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner however claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right to due process. He contended that he was denied due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justified his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then “confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reason.”

Petitioner also insisted that he had a valid and meritorious defense. He cited Article 48 of the Family Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law “looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default.” He contended that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.

However, the failure of the counsel to inform petitioner of adverse judgment to enable him to appeal is an inexcusable negligence and not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. Similarly inexcusable is the counsel’s failure to notify the court of petitioner’s confinement. Petitioner cannot claim he was deprived of due process by the Court.

 

 

 

Source:

Emilio Tuason v. CA and Maria Victoria Tuason, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996. Retrieved from: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/apr1996/gr_116607_1996.html.

By:

JOY G. DE LOYOLA

Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz, Laguna

CASE DIGEST – ARTICLE 32, FAMILY CODE – Zenaida Beso v. Judge Daguman

EXEMPTION FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE:

CASE DIGEST – Article 32

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ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant,
vs.
Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan–Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.

A.M. No. 99-1211           January 28, 2000
(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 98-471-MTJ)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997. After the marriage was solemnized, the man just abandoned his wife without any reason. Because of this, the woman had to go to the registrar to secure their marriage contract but to her surprised, no marriage contract that had been registered in the office of the registrar. The registrar gave advice to Zenaida Beso to write the judge who solemnized their marriage but likewise to her surprised, Judge Daguman who solemnized their marriage told her that her husband got all the copies of their marriage certificate and none was even left to him or was retained to the judge.

This is the reason why Zenaida learned that the judge solemnized their marriage out of his jurisdiction and was negligent in not retaining a copy and likewise in not registering their marriage to the civil registrar as prescribed by law.

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar with the following facts:

  (a)  On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainant’s fiancée, Bernardito A. Yman, got married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondent’s residence in Calbayog City, Samar;

  (b)  That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant;

  (c)  That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding her Marriage Contract.  The complainant found out that her marriage was not registered;

  (d)  The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent.

The respondent averred with the following rationale:

  (a)  Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the complainant and Yman.  He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the complainant deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy;

  (b)  Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married;

  (c)  Respondent’s failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.

  (d)  Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated, August 11, 1998 found the respondent Judge “…committed non-feasance in office” and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000).

Issues:

1. Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction; and,
2. Whether or not the respondent committed negligence by not retaining a copy and not registering the complainant’s marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar.

Held:

1. Yes. The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction.

Article 7 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, “Any incumbent member of the judiciary with the court’s jurisdiction”.  In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the Family Code, there are only three instances with which a judge may solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction:

1.1. when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;

1.2. when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

1.3. where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

In this case, none of the three instances is present.

2. Yes.  The judge committed negligence.

Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family code, such duty to register the marriage is the respondent’s duty.  The same article provides, “It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage… to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen (15) days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized.  Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate.  The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license, and in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8”.

The recommendation of the OCA stands.

 

NOTE: Case related to Articles 7 and 23, Family Code.

 

Source:

Zenaida Beso v. Judge Juan Daguman, MCTC, A.M. No. 99-1211, January 28, 2000. Retrieved from: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/am_mtj-99-1211_2000.html.

 

 

By:

JOY G. DE LOYOLA

Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz, Laguna

 

CASE DIGEST – ARTICLE 16, FAMILY CODE – Filipina Sy v. CA

PARENTAL ADVICE:

CASE DIGEST – Article 16

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FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.

G.R. No. 127263             April 12, 2000

QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father’s residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father.

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property. The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their children to her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by him when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity.

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner Filipina and private respondent Fernando is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony.

2. Whether or not Fernando Sy is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

Held:

The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license.

A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.

The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is clearly applicable in this case.

On the other hand, the issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain the Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner and private respondent is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.

 

NOTE: Case related to Article 4, Family Code.

 

Source:

Filipina Sy v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000. Retrieved from: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/apr2000/gr_127263_2000.html

 

 

By:

JOY G. DE LOYOLA

Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz, Laguna

ARTICLE 96 of the FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Title IV – PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Section 4 – Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community Property

ARTICLE 96

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Article 96

The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a)

RULES ON JOINT ADMINISTRATION. Unlike in the Civil Code, the Family Code now provides for a joint administration and enjoyment of the community property by the husband and wife. Under the Civil Code, it was the husband who was the administrator of the conjugal partnership property.

In spite of joint administration of the community property by the husband and wife, the husband’s decision prevails in case of disagreement. The wife, however, has a remedy against such decision, for she can question it in court within five (5) years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. After that period, the action shall prescribe.

WHEN A SPOUSE MAY ASSUME SOLE POWER OF ADMINISTRATION. There are instances when one spouse may assume sole powers of administration as when:

(a)one spouse is incapacitated; or

(b)one spouse is unable to participate in the administration of the common property.

Such power as administrator, however, does not include the power to sell properties of the community property. For such administrator-spouse to validly sell properties of the community property, there must be an authorization from the court or the written consent of the other spouse.

* The sale by the husband of conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is void. The reason for this is that, selling properties is an act of ownership or dominion which is not present in administration.

* Awareness of the other spouse of such sale is not consent. The reason is that it requires the written consent of the other spouse.

* However, even if the sale by one of the spouses is void, as it was done without the consent of the other, it is a continuing offer between the consenting spouse and the third person and may be perfected as a binding contract upon acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

While the law provides for administration of the husband and wife, yet, they are free to agree that one of them may administer the absolute community of properties. That agreement is valid and binding between the parties.

The provision of the law providing for joint administration is for the purpose of recognizing the equality of the spouses — since their interests in the community of properties are equal.

MORTGAGE OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY WITHOUT CONSENT OF SPOUSE IS VOID; SUBSEQUENT EXECUTION OF SPA PERFECTS THE CONTRACT. Sale by a spouse of conjugal property without the consent of the other is void but the execution of an SPA authorizing the sale can be considered as acceptance of the mortgage by the other spouse that perfected the contract or continuing offer.

SALE OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY BY A SPOUSE WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE OTHER; VOID, EVEN IF SEPARATED IN FACT. If the husband and wife are living separately from one another and one of them sells a conjugal property without the consent of the other, the sale is void.

Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that the other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.

SALE OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY BY A SPOUSE WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE OTHER EVEN IF PARTLY; EFFECT. The sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of he partnership is void. prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement.

The right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.

The sale without the consent of the other spouse may cause disunity in the family.

MORTGAGE OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY BY HUSBAND WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE WIFE IS VOID. The husband and the wife owned properties. The husband executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of a person to secure a loan with the use of a conjugal property as a security. The loan was secured with a mortgage over said property. The loan was not paid, hence, there was foreclose of the mortgage.

 

 

 

References:

Judge Albano, Ed Vincent S. (2017). Family Code of the Philippines.

Sta. Maria, Melencio S. (2015). Persons and Family Relations Law.

 

 

By:

JOY G. DE LOYOLA

Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz, Laguna

 

 

 

 

ARTICLE 80 of the FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Title IV – PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

ARTICLE 80

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Article 80

In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.

This rule shall not apply:

1.Where both spouses are aliens;

2.With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located; and,

3.With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.

RULES GOVERNING PROPERTY RELATIONS. The property relations of spouses can be governed by the will of the parties provided that their agreement will not be contrary to law or public policy and it should be within the limits provided in the Family Code (Article 1). If the contracting parties are Filipinos, their property relations will be governed by Philippine laws in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. This rule applies even if they are married abroad or even if they reside abroad.

However, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, real property as well as personal property shall always be subject to the law of the country where it is situated. In case where a contract is entered into involving parties abroad, the extrinsic validity of such contract, whether executed here or abroad, will not be governed by Philippine laws. If the contract were executed here, the laws of the country where the property is located may govern the extrinsic validity of the contract.

The rule set forth in the first paragraph of Article 80 is not applicable where both spouses are aliens married in the Philippines.

LAW THAT GOVERNS PROPERTY RELATIONS; RULES. This is an application of the national law principle regardless of the place of celebration of the marriage. The law applies if the spouses are living in the Philippines or abroad, or even if they have properties located in the Philippines or abroad. Their national law follows them wherever they are.

If the spouses are aliens, their national law shall govern their property relationship. Thus, this is an application of the national law principle.

EXCEPTIONS: The two (2) exceptions under paragraphs 2 and 3 are applications of the principle of lex situs.

Illustration: X and Y, both Filipinos, were married in the United States. If they enter into any marriage settlement, they shall be governed by Philippine law; hence, they can agree on the conjugal partnership regime, complete separation or dowry system. If they have no agreement, then, they shall be governed by the principle that their property relationship is one absolute community. Or, if the agreement is void, the property relationship shall be absolute community of property.

 

Unlocking of Difficulties:

* STIPULATION – an agreement or concession made by parties in a judicial proceeding (or by their attorneys) relating to the business before the court

* MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT – an ante-nuptial agreement entered into by a man and a woman planning to marry by fixing the property regime that will govern their present and future properties during the marriage. Note that in its absence, the system of absolute community property is presumed to govern the relationship. Also referred to as prenuptial agreement, or a “prenup”; an agreement executed between two parties who plan to get married, in preparation for the property regime that would govern their conjugal property during the marriage, such agreements are also commonly known as “Pre-Nuptial Agreement”

“The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gain, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern.” (Article 75, Family Code of the Philippines)

* COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY – all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of their marriage or acquired thereafter (Articles 88 and 91, Family Code of the Philippines)

* PROPERTY REGIME – the set of rules agreed upon by the parties, before getting married, which would govern their property relations during the course of their married life

* LEX SITUS  – law of the place where property is situated; the general rule is that lands and other immovables are governed by the law of the state where they are situated

 

 

References:

Judge Albano, Ed Vincent S. (2017). Family Code of the Philippines.

Sta. Maria, Melencio S. (2015). Persons and Family Relations Law.

 

 

By:

JOY G. DE LOYOLA

Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz, Laguna

ARTICLE 64 of the FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Title II – LEGAL SEPARATION

ARTICLE 64

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Article 64

After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for  revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured.

The action to revoke the donation under this article must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal separation has become final.(107a)

DONATIONS AND BENEFICIARY IN INSURANCE. Donations and the act of the innocent party in designating the guilty spouse as a beneficiary in an insurance are essentially acts of liberality and the law gives the option to the innocent party whether he or she will revoke the donation or the designation as beneficiary of the guilty party in an insurance. Insofar as the designation as beneficiary of the guilty spouse in an insurance is concerned, such designation, even if irrevocable will be considered revoked upon written notification thereof to the insured.

In case of donations, if the innocent spouse decides to revoke a donation, he or she must file an action for revocation within five years from the time the decree of legal separation has become final.

However, if the donation is void, such as in the case of a donation in violation of Article 87, the right to bring an action to declare the nullity of the donation does not prescribe.

Article 87 provides that “every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing”.

The Law provides for other effects of legal separation, such as:

1.the innocent spouse may revoke donations made by him/her to the offending spouse;

2.the innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the guilty spouse as beneficiary in any insurance policy even if such designation is stipulated as irrevocable;

The revocation of the donation must be recorded in the proper registry of property where the property is located. This is to protect the parties against the rights of innocent third persons.

Illustration: A, prior to his marriage to B, donated real property to the latter. It was registered later under her name, but 10 years after their marriage, B gave rise to a cause for legal separation. A sued for legal separation and it was granted, pronouncing B as the guilty spouse. A revoked the donation but the revocation was not recorded in the registry of property. In the meantime, or after the revocation, B sold property to C, a buyer in good faith and for value, and obtained a title. The revocation is not effective as against C, the buyer in good faith and for value because of the protection given by the Torrens System to a buyer in good faith and for value. For C need not even look beyond the title B to determine if there is a defect therein. In fact, Article 64 of the Code says that alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation is registered in the registries of property shall be respected.

The law further says that the revocation is not by operation of law. There must be an action filed in court to that effect and the law prescribes a period of five years from the time the decree of legal separation has come final. That means that the inaction of the innocent spouse for five years is equivalent to a waiver of his rights to revoke the donation as this is a right that can be waived whether impliedly or expressly and the waiver is valid.

On the matter of the revocation of the designation in an insurance policy, the law requires for its effectivity that a written notice be given to the insured.

 

Unlocking of Difficulties:

* LEGAL SEPARATION – judicially authorized separation from bed and board — a mensa et thoro — but the spouses remain married. There are at least 10 grounds under the Family Code by which legal separation can be effected (Article 55, Family Code)

* DONATION – an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it (Article 725, Civil Code)

* BENEFICIARY – any person or entity (like a charity) who is to receive assets or profits from an estate, a trust, an insurance policy or any instrument in which there is distribution

* ALIENATION – the capacity for a piece of property or a property right to be sold or otherwise transferred from one party to another

* LIEN – an encumbrance that attaches to a certain transaction or specific property for the satisfaction of a debt or performance of an obligation or other duty that is created by operation of law, e.g., by agreement of the parties in a contract, as in a mortgage lien

* ENCUMBRANCE – a lien or claim on the title or possession of property which thus burdens its use or sale, or transfer

 

 

 

 

 

Reference:

Judge Albano, Ed Vincent S. (2017). Family Code of the Philippines.

Sta. Maria, Melencio S. (2015). Persons and Family Relations Law.

 

 

By:

JOY G. DE LOYOLA

Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz, Laguna

 

 

ARTICLE 48 of the FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Title I – MARRIAGE

Chapter 3 – VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

ARTICLE 48

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Article 48

In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (88a)

REASON FOR THE LAW. The intention of the law is clear, that is to preserve the marriage. The State has interest in the marriage as the foundation of the family, that is why, it is required that in case of annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage, the prosecutor or fiscal assigned to the court where the case is pending must appear on behalf of the State to see to it that there would be no collusion between the spouses or see to it that the evidence is not fabricated. This law emphasizes the fact that marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. If the fiscal or prosecutor finds collusion or fabrication of the evidence during the trial, he can move for the dismissal of the case. In fact, the law even prohibits the rendition of judgment based on stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. As said elsewhere, the nature, consequence and incidents of marriage are determined by law and not subject to stipulations.

The requirement that the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to appear is intended to prevent annulment of marriage in cases where no ground care, not only to prevent fraud and collusion by the parties, but also to guard against an honest mistake under which they may be acting (Capistrano, Civil Code of the Phils., 1950 ed., p.105).

NO DEFAULT IN ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE. Well-entrenched in Philippine law is the rule that a party in action for the annulment of marriage cannot be declared in default. This is so because the granting of annulment of marriage or declaration of nullity of the same by default is fraught with danger of collusion. The collusion is suspected when the defendant, despite the service of summons, does not file an answer or contest the action, hence, the duty of the court to order the prosecutor to appear to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence to be presented is not fabricated. The reason for the law is obvious from the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but an inviolable social institution in which the State is virtually interested because the State finds no strong anchor than on good, solid and happy families.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS AUTHORIZED TO INTERVENE IN PROCEEDINGS FOR NULLITY AND ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGES. No less than the Constitution seeks to preserve the sanctity of the marriage. The reason is that, marriage is the foundation of the family and the family is the foundation of society. That is why, the law on marriage is restrictive. Even if there is no answer of the defendant in actions for declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment thereof or even in legal separation, there is an inherent opponent, the State. That is why, more often than not parties would question the appearance of the State through the Solicitor General in such proceedings. The reason why the State intervenes is to protect its interest in the marriage.

The issuance of the Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which became effective on March 15, 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below:

Section 5. Contents and form of petition. —
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

…

Section 18. Memorandum. —  The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within 15 days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

…

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or be registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of 15 days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

COLLUSION. Collusion occurs where, for purposes of getting an annulment or nullity decree, the parties come up with an agreement making it appear that the marriage is defective due to the existence of any of the grounds for the annulment of marriage or the declaration of its nullity provided by law and agreeing to represent such false or non-existent cause of action before the proper court with the objective of facilitating the issuance of a decree of annulment or nullity of marriage. The commission of a matrimonial offense, or the creation of the appearance of having committed it, with the consent or privity of the other party, or under an arrangement between spouses, has been held to be collusion. Collusion implies a corrupt agreement between the husband and wife and, therefore, renders dismissible any annulment or nullity case initiated through the same.

STIPULATION OF FACTS OR CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT. An annulment or nullity decree cannot be issued by the Court on the sole basis of a stipulation of facts, or a confession of judgment (Cardenas v Cardenas and Rinen, 98 Phil. 73). The former is practically an admission by both parties made in court agreeing to the existence of the act constituting the ground for annulment or for the declaration of nullity of the marriage, while the latter is the admission made in court by the respondent or defendant admitting faulty as invoked by the plaintiff to sever the marriage ties.

 

 

References:

Judge Albano, Ed Vincent S. (2017). Family Code of the Philippines.

Sta. Maria, Melencio S. (2015). Persons and Family Relations Law.

 

 

By:

JOY G. DE LOYOLA

Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz, Laguna

 

 

 

 

 

 

CASE DIGEST – Pilapil v Ibay-Somera

Effect if Filipino obtains divorce against a foreigner spouse:

CASE DIGEST – Article 26

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IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

G.R. No. 80116     June 30, 1989

REGALADO, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to to Imelda, the latter had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

Held:

The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

 

 

Source:

Pilapil v Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989. Retrieved from: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jun1989/gr_80116_1989.html.

By:

JOY G. DE LOYOLA

Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz, Laguna

 

ARTICLE 32 of the FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Title I – MARRIAGE

Chapter 2 – MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM THE LICENSE REQUIREMENT

ARTICLE 32

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Article 32

A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.

EXEMPTION FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE. Articles 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, and 34 are situations where the contracting parties need not obtain a marriage license prior to getting validly married. These situations are explicitly declared by Article 3(2) as exceptions to the formal requirement of a valid marriage license. These exceptions are likewise referred to in Article 9, which provides that “a marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either of the contracting parties habitually reside, except in a marriage where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title”.

MILITARY COMMANDER. As far as the military commander is concerned, he/she must be a commissioned officer, which means that his/her rank should start from second lieutenant, ensign and above (Webster Dictionary, 1991 Ed).

He/she must likewise be a commander of a unit, which means any subdivision (regiment, battalion, etc) of an army whose strength is laid down by regulations (Webster Dictionary, 1991 Ed).

However, from the deliberations of the Civil Code revision committee, it appears that “unit” has been referred to be at least a “battalion” (Minutes of the Civil Code Revision Committee held on May 23, 1983, page 4).

Also, he/she can only solemnize a marriage if it is in articulo mortis and in the absence of a chaplain.

The marriage must be solemnized within the zone of military operation and during such operation.

The contracting parties may either be members of the armed forces or civilians.

example: X, a member of the armed forces was injured in an area of military operation, for instance, Mindanao. He was airlifted to Manila where he was confined at the Philippine General Hospital. At one point in time, he was at the point of death. Can a military commander solemnize his marriage with Y, his girlfriend without a marriage license? The answer is no because the law contemplates of a situation where the marriage must be solemnized in the zone of military operation. Such commander does not have the authority outside of it, especially so that such authority is granted to him only under extraordinary circumstances. The marriage is void for lack of marriage license. But suppose it was the mayor of the City of Manila who solemnized the marriage of X and Y, then the marriage is valid,  but this time Article 27 of the Family Code applies, not Article 32.

 

References:

Judge Albano, Ed Vincent S. (2017). Family Code of the Philippines.

Sta. Maria, Melencio S. (2015). Persons and Family Relations Law.

 

 

By:

JOY G. DE LOYOLA

Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz, Laguna

 

 

 

 

ARTICLE 16 of the FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Title I – MARRIAGE

Chapter 1 – REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE

ARTICLE 16

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Article 16

In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said certificate of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage.

Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice, the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph.

PARENTAL ADVICE. Absence of parental advice does not affect the marriage. It does not even make the marriage annullable, as non-advice is not a ground for annulment provided for in Article 45 of the Family Code. While it is not an essential nor a formal requirement under Articles 2 and 3,

prescribing parental advice for those 21-25 years of age is in keeping with Philippine tradition and it does not bar marriage totally. It is just a vehicle to induce further and more  mature deliberation over the decision to get married (Minutes of the 185th Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law committees, June 27, 1987, page 6).

The mere fact that the advice was not given and the marriage was solemnized does not make the marriage void. The formalities required by law must however be complied with.

The issuance of the marriage license even before the lapse of the 90-day period if no advice was granted does not make the marriage void. It is still valid, but criminal, civil or administrative sanctions may be imposed on the officer issuing the license.

 

 

Reference:

Judge Albano, Ed Vincent S. (2017). Family Code of the Philippines.

Sta. Maria, Melencio S. (2015). Persons and Family Relations Law.

 

 

By:

JOY G. DE LOYOLA

Laguna State Polytechnic University – Sta.Cruz